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Abstract 
We examined (structurally advantaged) non-Aborigines’ willingness for political action 
against government redress to (structurally disadvantaged) Aborigines in Australia. Consistent 
with Pettigrew and Riley’s (1971) suggestions, we found non-Aborigines opposed to government 
redress to be high in symbolic racism (Sears, 1988) and to perceive their in-group as deprived 
relative to Aborigines. However, only perceived relative deprivation was associated with feelings 
of group-based anger. And, consistent with relative deprivation and emotion theory, it was 
group-based anger that fully mediated a willingness for political action against government 
redress. Thus, the specific group-based emotion of anger explained why symbolic racism and 
relative deprivation promoted a willingness for political action against government redress to a 
structurally disadvantaged out-group. Theoretical and political implications are discussed.
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Angry opposition to government redress: 
When the structurally advantaged perceive themselves as relatively deprived 
 All around the world, members of ethnic and other minority groups suffer severe 
structural disadvantage. From Australia, to the United States, Britain, and Brazil, the structurally 
disadvantaged have less power, wealth, and health relative to other groups (for a review see 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Decades of research on “relative deprivation” has shown that group 
members who perceive such disadvantage and interpret it as unfair are most intent on actively 
opposing it (for a review see Walker & H. J. Smith, 2002). Since Runciman (1966) it has been 
suggested that anger about this kind of group-level relative deprivation provides the 
psychological fuel for political action among the structurally disadvantaged (for a review see H. 
J. Smith & Kessler, 2004). For example, East Germans who most felt “annoyed” and “explosive” 
about their group’s disadvantage relative to West Germans most wanted to publicly protest 
(Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). 
 As in the East German example, it is common for research to focus on perceptions of 
relative deprivation among structurally disadvantaged groups (for a review, see Walker & H. J. 
Smith, 2002). While such opposition from below is no doubt important, it leaves unexamined the 
role of the structurally advantaged. Given their greater power and resources, the structurally 
advantaged play an important part in determining the potential success of political action by the 
structurally disadvantaged (Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). Where the advantaged are willing to 
engage in political action against government or other systematic redress (e.g., apology, 
economic redistribution, compensatory “positive action”), they pose a significant barrier to such 
efforts. 
In this paper, we consider why members of a structurally advantaged group are willing to 
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engage in political action against government redress of an ethnic minority’s structural 
disadvantage. A good deal of research has shown symbolic (or modern) racism to explain such 
willingness (for a review, see Sears, 1988). However, we think there is likely to be a more 
specific explanation than the general negativity toward the structurally disadvantaged captured in 
symbolic racism. In a departure from most research on relative deprivation, we examine 
Pettigrew and colleagues’ notion that the structurally advantaged opposed to government redress 
perceive themselves as relatively deprived. Based in the notion that the specific emotion of anger 
gives greater psychological force to the perception of group relative deprivation (Runciman, 
1966), we suggest such group-based anger as the best explanation of a willingness for political 
action against government redress to the structurally disadvantaged. 
Action Intentions Against Government Redress 
 A great deal of research has examined prejudice, and other negative attitudes, as an 
explanation of why members of structurally advantaged groups oppose government and other 
systematic redress to the structurally disadvantaged (for reviews see Bobo, 1988; Leach et al., 
2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). One of the most popular explanations is that of symbolic racism 
(for reviews see Sears, 1988; Taylor, 2002). In the United States, symbolic racism is 
conceptualized as a set of negative attitudes that white Americans hold about black Americans as 
a group. Sears and colleagues argue that a mixture of “anti-black affect” and individualistic 
“work ethic” values underlie whites’ attitudes that blacks (1) enjoy undeserved benefits from 
government “handouts,” (2) violate the work ethic by their lack of effort, (3) make excessive 
demands for public resources, and (4) face little discrimination (see Henry & Sears, 2002; Sears 
& Henry, 2003). Consistent with their conceptualization, when combined into a unitary scale of 
symbolic racism, these negative attitudes are a strong predictor of white American opposition to 
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compensatory “affirmative action,” school integration, and other forms of government redress to 
black Americans (for a review see Sears, 1988). The negative attitudes in symbolic racism have 
also been shown to predict white opposition to government redress to ethnic minorities in 
Britain, France, Germany, and Holland (e.g., Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) as well as in Australia 
(e.g., Pedersen & Walker, 1997). 
 Although symbolic racism provides an empirical explanation of action intentions against 
government redress, it does little to clarify the actual social psychology at work among members 
of structurally advantaged groups. For example, conceptualizing symbolic racism as prejudice -- 
a general, negative orientation toward an out-group – does not specify how the structurally 
advantaged perceive their inter-group relation to the structurally disadvantaged (Leach et al., 
2002; more generally see E.R. Smith, 1993). This is important because a failure to perceive the 
in-group as advantaged over a disadvantaged out-group is an obvious basis of opposition to 
government redress to the out-group (Leach et al., 2002). As a general, negative orientation 
toward an out-group, symbolic racism also fails to specify the more specific emotion that 
members of a structurally advantaged group may feel about their perceived inter-group relation 
with a structurally disadvantaged out-group (Leach et al., 2002; more generally see E.R. Smith, 
1993; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). 
Given the shortcomings of the prejudice concept, E.R. Smith (1993) called upon research 
in inter-group relations to focus on specific emotions rather than the more general negative affect 
and attitudes captured in prejudice. Based in appraisal theories of emotion (for a review, see 
Lazarus, 1991), E.R. Smith (1993) argued that it is specific, group-based, emotions that best 
explain group members’ action intentions in their inter-group relations (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000). We believe that an early approach to group-based emotion – relative deprivation 
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theory – suggests a specific model of how members of a structurally advantaged group perceive 
and feel about their inter-group relation in a way that explains their willingness to engage in 
political action against government redress to the structurally disadvantaged. 
Inverted Relative Deprivation and Anger 
 Some time ago, Pettigrew and colleagues (Pettigrew & Riley, 1971; Vanneman & 
Pettigrew, 1972) suggested group relative deprivation as an explanation of working class white 
Americans’ political activity for anti-black candidates in the United States in the late 1960s. 
Although most previous and subsequent work on relative deprivation has examined it among the 
structurally disadvantaged, Pettigrew and colleagues believed it to be a potent form of prejudice 
among the structurally advantaged. Consistent with this, Pettigrew and Riley (1971) found those 
men who expressed the most prejudice to most perceive the “average man” as relatively deprived 
compared to the past. More recent studies in western Europe (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and 
the United States (Bobo, 1988; Taylor, 2002), have shown that the perception of relative 
deprivation predicts whites’ opposition to ethnic out-groups as well as to policies that redress 
their structural disadvantage. Outside of psychology, variants of relative deprivation theory 
continue to be applied to examples of political action against government and other efforts to 
redress structural disadvantage (e.g., Omi & Winant, 1986; Wellmann, 1993). 
Like most work in relative deprivation (for a review, see Walker & H.J. Smith, 2002), 
Pettigrew and colleagues suggested that a perception of group relative deprivation was likely to 
promote feelings of anger. Although they did not examine this group-based anger, based in 
relative deprivation theory they assumed that anger was the psychological fuel that translated the 
perception of group relative deprivation into political action. The well-established link between 
anger and action intentions shown in emotion research is consistent with this assumption (for 
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reviews, see Averill, 1983; Lazarus, 1991). A good deal of research on anger shows it to be 
associated with wanting to actively challenge perceived injustice (e.g., Roseman, Wiest, & 
Schwarz, 1994; for a review see Averill, 1983). Consistent with this, recent research has shown 
group-based anger about inter-group conflict (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000), unjust treatment from an 
authority (e.g., van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), or unfair structural advantage 
(e.g., Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006) to promote a readiness to act. 
We think that Pettigrew and colleagues’ conceptualization of relative deprivation-based 
anger may be fruitfully combined with symbolic racism and the more recent perspective on 
group-based emotion. Together, these three lines of work suggest a model of why members of 
structurally advantaged groups may be willing to engage in political action against government 
redress. Thus, consistent with Pettigrew and colleagues, as well as Sears and colleagues, we 
expect members of a structurally advantaged group who are opposed to government redress to be 
prejudiced (i.e., high in symbolic racism). However, given that this negative orientation is very 
general in nature, we do not expect it to offer a specific explanation of a willingness for political 
action against government redress. Rather, based in Pettigrew and colleagues, we expect 
symbolic racism to promote the more specific perception that the structurally advantaged in-
group is relatively deprived (symbolic racism → group relative deprivation ). As suggested by 
relative deprivation theory, this perception should promote the specific group-based emotion of 
anger (group relative deprivation → group-based anger). And, it is this group-based anger that 
should best explain a willingness to engage in political action against government redress to the 
structurally disadvantaged (group-based anger → action intentions). Thus, we expect group-
based anger to fully mediate a willingness for political action (symbolic racism → group relative 
deprivation → group-based anger → action intentions). 
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Our model of relative deprivation-based anger may be especially applicable to Western 
Australia, where the present studies were conducted. Previous research has shown that many of 
the structurally advantaged non-Aboriginal majority believe that the Aboriginal minority unfairly 
benefit from government handouts (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, 1998; 
Pedersen & Walker, 1997). Thus, despite great evidence to the contrary, many non-Aborigines 
may perceive their in-group as deprived relative to Aborigines, who they perceive as unfairly 
advantaged by government handouts. Anecdotal evidence of this can be found in the political 
rhetoric of Pauline Hanson and her now discredited One Nation party (see Broome, 2002; Fraser 
& Islam, 2000). In a speech to the Australian Parliament, Hanson (1996, p. 47) said, “I am fed up 
to the back teeth with the inequalities that are being promoted by the government and paid for by 
the taxpayer under the assumption that Aboriginals are the most disadvantaged people in 
Australia.” She went on to imply that it was the hard working (white?) “Australian” who was 
most disadvantaged in a society that had forsaken them (see Rapley, 1998). This is very similar 
to the political rhetoric Pettigrew and colleagues identified as tapping into perceived relative 
deprivation among white working class men in the United States in the late 1960s. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Using Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (1996) classifications, one low-income, one 
medium-income, and one high-income suburb in the metropolitan area of Perth, Western 
Australia was selected at random from all those listed for each socio-economic level. For each 
suburb, 150 residents were chosen at random from publicly available electoral rolls. Of the 450 
sent questionnaires, 122 (27%) usable questionnaires were returned from self-identified non-
Aborigines. This is an acceptable rate of return for this kind of mail survey (Dillman, 2000). 
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Participants were first asked their sex, age, and place of birth. We also asked them to 
describe their political orientation with a scale that ranged from 1 “strongly right” to 5 “strongly 
left.” Education level was assessed with a 5-point scale that ranged from 1 “primary school only” 
to 5 “attended or completed university.” In addition, an item asking for postal code was used to 
discern the average income of participants’ neighborhood from census data (i.e., Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 1996).  
Participants’ average age was 49 years. Participants tended to be fairly well-educated, 
with the average person receiving more than secondary education. On average participants 
identified themselves at the “centre” of the political spectrum and came from postal codes of 
middle income. Importantly, however, these demographic characteristics showed little 
association with the measures of interest (see also Pilot Study 1 below). Thus, they are not 
discussed further. 
Measures 
Symbolic Racism 
We used 7 items from a scale recently developed by Pedersen, Beven, Walker, and 
Griffiths (2004) to assess symbolic racism toward Aborigines in Australia (α = .85). Although 
some items were grounded in particular aspects of the Australian context (e.g., land rights), the 
items reflect the general content of symbolic racism (see Henry & Sears, 2002). Thus, two items 
assessed the view that Aborigines have undeserved benefits: “Land rights for Aborigines are just 
a way of them getting more than they deserve,” “Aboriginal people get given more government 
money than they should.” Two items assessed the view that Aborigines are excessively 
demanding: “Aboriginal people are very vocal and loud about their rights,” “Urban Aborigines 
are pretty hostile.” Two other items assessed perceived discrimination: “The only racial 
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discrimination in Australia these days is in favour of Aboriginal people,” “The media is often 
biased against Aborigines” (reversed). One item assessed violation of the work-ethic (reversed): 
“Aboriginal people work as hard as anyone else.” On a Likert-type scale, responses could range 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (neither agree or disagree), to 7 (strongly agree). 
Relative Deprivation 
 To assess the specific perception of inter-group relative deprivation, we asked “Do you 
think non-Aborigines are advantaged, or disadvantaged, compared to Aborigines?” Responses 
were given on a 7-point bi-polar scale, anchored by 1 (Aborigines advantaged) and 7 (non-
Aborigines advantaged), and thus were reverse scored for analysis. This scale was used to 
reinforce the fact that participants had to evaluate their in-group’s deprivation relative to the out-
group’s advantage.1 It is important to highlight the fact that our measure of group-level relative 
deprivation assessed the in-group’s perceived deprivation relative to a specific out-group. This 
makes it different to Pettigrew and colleagues’ measure of perceived group deprivation relative 
to the in-group’s past. Thus, our measure assesses the kind of inter-group relative deprivation 
that theory expects to best explain inter-group phenomena (for reviews, see H.J. Smith & Ortiz, 
2002; Walker & H.J. Smith, 2002). 
Although “non-Aborigine” is not a common self-categorization in Australia, it is the most 
general in-group that can be compared to structurally disadvantaged Aborigines. Thus, it was the 
only in-group categorization that was appropriate for our interests. In other research in this 
region of Australia, Leach et al. (2006, Study 2) showed non-Aboriginal people to report seeing 
themselves as “non-Aborigines” when thinking about Aboriginal issues. 
Pilot Study. To validate our measure of inter-group relative deprivation, we embedded a 
pilot study into a survey designed to examine related issues (i.e., McGarty et al., 2005, Study 1). 
Relative deprivation and angry opposition     11 
We selected 500 names at random from the electoral roll of Perth, Western Australia. This 
publicly available list provides a name and address for every eligible voter. A questionnaire and 
accompanying letter was sent to the entire sample. A total of 164 questionnaires (33%) were 
returned from non-Aborigines. 
Respondents were asked to state their age and gender as well as their education level (1 = 
primary school only, 5 = university), income (1= under 10,000 dollars, 7 = over 50,000), and 
political affiliation (coded from left to right wing: 1= Australian Democrats/Greens, 2 = Labor 
Party, 3 = Liberal/National, 4 = One Nation Party). They were also given the items used in the 
current study to assess relative deprivation and opposition to government redress (in the form of 
an apology to Aborigines). 
Consistent with representative surveys in Western Australia (e.g., AC Nielsen, 2000), 
more respondents opposed (103) or were neutral to (12) government redress than supported it 
(43). The 115 participants who did not support government redress were extremely opposed to it 
(M = 6.50, SD = 1.00). Consistent with Pettigrew and colleagues’ suggestion, the 115 
participants who did not support government redress tended to perceive their in-group as 
relatively deprived (M = 4.72, SD = 1.65). Thus, they inverted the structural reality of Aboriginal 
disadvantage. And, the greater their perceived relative deprivation the greater their opposition to 
government redress, r (112) = .37, p < .001. However, perceived relative deprivation was 
uncorrelated to participants’ demographic characteristics, all r <.06, all p > .50. 
Group-based Emotions: Anger and Guilt 
Immediately after the relative deprivation question, participants were asked, “How do 
you feel about this?” A list of emotion terms, most of which were taken from Watson, Clark, and 
Tellegen (1988) and Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003, Study 2), were provided in a format based 
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on Watson et al.’s (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. Thus, participants were asked 
to indicate the degree to which they felt each emotion with a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely). 
Anger was assessed with 4 emotion terms: angry, hostile, indignant, and outraged (α = 
.83). While the first two terms emphasize intense arousal, the second two terms emphasize 
perceived injustice (see Lazarus, 1991). To provide a comparison to anger, we also assessed the 
similarly dysphoric emotion of guilt. Following Iyer et al. (2003), we used the six emotion terms: 
guilty, responsible, regretful, ashamed, remorseful, and blameworthy (α = .86). Given that we 
expect participants to perceive their in-group as relatively deprived, they should feel little of the 
self-recrimination captured in guilt (see Leach et al., 2002). 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. We assessed the latent structure of the emotions with a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Each of the 10 items was allowed to load only on its 
designated factor and no errors were allowed to correlate. As both emotions are dysphoric, the 
guilt and anger factors were allowed to correlate. The standardized loadings confirmed that each 
of the two factors was well defined by its items. For guilt, loadings ranged from .47 (regretful) to 
.87 (blameworthy). For anger, loadings ranged from .68 (indignant) to .96 (angry). All loadings 
differed from zero (all p < .05). Guilt and anger were reliably, but modestly, associated (φ = .26, 
p < .05). 
To assess model fit here and in subsequent analyses, we report the χ2 statistic. When a 
proposed model reproduces the observed covariance matrix, χ2 is not statistically reliable (i.e., p 
> .05). We also report a variety of fit indices based on χ2 (i.e., CFI, IFI, GFI). With sample < 
250, values > .90 indicate satisfactory fit. We also report the two most widely used residual 
indices (SRMR, RMSEA), which should fall below .10 in samples < 250 (for a review see Hu & 
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Bentler, 1999). 
Our hypothesized measurement model fit the data well. The sensitive χ2 statistic was 
large, but not highly reliable, χ2 (34) = 48.531, p = .051. Although the GFI (= .896) indicated 
marginal fit, two incremental indices (CFI = .969 and IFI = .969) showed excellent fit. In 
addition, the residual fit indices of the SRMR (= .081) and the RMSEA (= .072) showed good fit. 
Thus, the guilt and anger emotion terms appear to be satisfactory measures of two distinct 
constructs. 
Opposition to Government Redress  
A single item taken from AC Nielsen (2000) polls assessed opposition to redress in the 
form of a Federal government apology to Aborigines: “Do you think the government should say 
‘sorry’ for past actions?” Responses could range from 1 (I very strongly believe the government 
should say ‘sorry’) to 7 (I very strongly believe the government should NOT say ‘sorry’). This 
form of government redress is the most salient and hotly debated in Australia (Broome, 2002; 
McGarty et al., 2005). We used this item to identify those opposed to government redress, as we 
expect only these participants’ relative deprivation-based anger to predict their willingness for 
political action against government redress. 
Willingness for Political Action. Immediately after this question, participants were asked 
what they would be “willing to do to support their beliefs about government apology.” Taken 
from several widely used scales, these items assessed a willingness to engage in 10 specific 
political actions, such as “sending a letter of protest to government or media,” “help organize a 
demonstration,” and “vote for a political candidate who supports your view” (for a review see 
Brady, 1993). The willingness to engage in such specific action is a better predictor of actual 
action than are more general measures of broad support for goals such as government redress 
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(for a review see Ajzen, 1991). Items were presented with a scale ranging from 1 (very 
unwilling) to 7 (very willing) and formed a reliable scale (α = .91). 
Results 
Descriptive 
Consistent with representative surveys in Western Australia (e.g., AC Nielsen, 2000) and 
the Pilot Study, only a minority of this non-Aborigine sample supported government redress. 
That is, only 39 (32%) endorsed the values between 1 and 3 on the 7-point response scale. An 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed these 39 supporters to differ substantially from non-
supporters in their mean opinion on government redress, F (1, 115) = 575.49, p < .001, partial η2 
= .84. Whereas supporters of government redress were extremely supportive (M = 1.87, SD 
=.80), non-supporters were extremely opposed (M = 6.39 , SD = 1.03). In addition, an ANOVA 
showed supporters to differ substantially from non-supporters in perceived relative deprivation, 
F (1, 115) = 56.86, p < .001, partial η2 = .34. Importantly, supporters of government redress 
showed no sign of inverted relative deprivation. Instead, they perceived Aborigines as deprived 
relative to their non-Aboriginal in-group (M = 2.59, SD = 1.52). Where members of structurally 
advantaged in-groups perceive a structurally disadvantaged out-group as relatively deprived they 
are likely to feel self-critical emotions such as guilt (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). 
Unlike the anger we expect to explain action intentions against government redress, self-critical 
emotions should explain support for government redress and other forms of collective restitution 
(for a review see Leach et al., 2002). This was shown in a series of recent studies Leach et al. 
(2006) conducted in the same region of Australia examined here. 
As our interest is in explaining opposition to government redress, we focused on the 77 
participants (i.e., 68 opposed, 9 neutral) who did not support government apology (63% of the 
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total N). As mentioned above, these non-supporters were extremely opposed to government 
redress (see Table 1). Consistent with our conceptualization and the Pilot Study, these non-
supporters perceived their in-group as relatively deprived (see Table 1). And, as expected, only 
non-supporters of government redress showed explicit endorsement of symbolic racism and 
showed a willingness for political action against government redress. As our conceptual model 
argues that inverted relative deprivation explains action intentions against government redress, 
only those participants who oppose government redress are relevant to our interests. Thus, the 
mediation analyses below focus on these 77 participants. 
Explanatory Models 
We used EQS 6.1 to estimate covariance structure models to account for the hypothesized 
relationships between measures. The full mediation model shown in Figure 1 represents our 
specific hypotheses. As symbolic racism is conceptualized as an indicator of participants’ 
general orientation toward Aborigines, it is specified as an exogenous variable that only predicts 
the more specific inter-group perception of relative deprivation. Given our hypothesis that 
participants feel anger about their perceived relative deprivation, our model treats the two group-
based emotions as mediators between relative deprivation and political action intentions. Our 
model specifies that symbolic racism and relative deprivation have no direct effect on a 
willingness for political action, and thus it provides a strict test of our hypothesis that the 
emotion of anger is a full mediator of such willingness (see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). 
As expected, the full mediation model fit the data well. The χ2 was not reliable: χ2 (2) = 
7.60, p = .18. The other indices also showed good fit for a sample of this size: CFI = .958, IFI = 
961, GFI = .949, SRMR = .074, RMSEA = .098. The standardized path estimates shown in 
Figure 1a provide more specific support for our hypotheses. Although symbolic racism was a 
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strong predictor of relative deprivation, the model fit well without estimating either of the 
following two direct paths: symbolic racism → anger, and symbolic racism → willingness for 
political action. Thus, as expected, symbolic racism had no direct association with anger or the 
willingness for political action. 
As expected, relative deprivation was a strong predictor of anger. And, anger fully 
accounted for the link between relative deprivation and a willingness for political action against 
government redress. Confirming that it is the specific emotion of anger that played this 
mediating role, the equally dysphoric emotion of guilt was unrelated to relative deprivation or 
the willingness for political action. In fact, the WALD test for model modification indicated that 
both paths involving guilt could be eliminated without worsening model fit (while adding 2 
degrees of freedom and, thus, parsimony). 
Alternative Models 
 To provide further support for the hypotheses represented in the full mediation model, we 
estimated two alternative models. The first examined the possibility that group-based emotion 
was only a partial mediator of relative deprivation and symbolic racism. The second examined a 
reversed mediation model where relative deprivation and symbolic racism were specified as 
mediators of the emotions. 
Partial Mediation. Importantly, a model specifying partial mediation of both relative 
deprivation and symbolic racism provided no better fit than the more parsimonious full 
mediation model: Δχ2 (2) = .600, p = .741. This is due to the fact that neither relative deprivation 
(γ = -.12, p = .441) nor symbolic racism (γ = .08, p = .437) directly predicted the willingness for 
political action. Thus, the full mediation model appears preferable to any of the possible partial 
mediation models. 
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Reverse Mediation. In order to obtain more support for the mediating role of emotion, we 
tested an alternative mediation model, where relative deprivation and symbolic racism were 
specified as full mediators of guilt and anger (see Figure 1b). The parameter estimates suggest 
against this model as a viable alternative to our hypothesized model. Most importantly, symbolic 
racism was a weak, non-reliable, predictor of the willingness for political action. This suggests 
against it as an alternative to anger as an explanation of such intentions. In addition, the fact that 
relative deprivation predicts political action intentions only half as well as anger does in the 
hypothesized model, suggests that relative deprivation is not a viable alternative to anger as an 
explanation of such willingness. 
Although it is not possible to make a direct statistical comparison between the reverse 
mediation and hypothesized mediation model (because they are not nested), we can assess the 
degree to which the reverse mediation model fit the data. As expected, the reverse mediation 
model fit unsatisfactorily, with a highly reliable χ2 (3) = 24.73, p < .001. Other fit indices were 
also highly unsatisfactory: CFI = .650, IFI =.685, GFI = .850, SRMR = .119, RMSEA = .366. 
We also looked to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to help distinguish between the two 
models, as it compares the parsimony of models based on the same covariance matrix. The AIC 
showed our hypothesized model to be superior, as it had a lower AIC (-2.40) than the reverse 
mediation model (AIC = 9.71). Thus, it appears better to presume that group-based emotion 
explains the effects of relative deprivation and symbolic racism, rather than vice versa. 
Discussion 
Although Australian Aborigines suffer severe structural disadvantage, this tended not to 
be perceived by the non-Aboriginal participants who opposed government redress to them. In 
fact, these participants perceived their structurally advantaged in-group as relatively deprived. 
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This relative deprivation, which inverted the reality of the in-group’s structural advantage, 
promoted group-based feelings of anger. As such, this study offers the first direct support for the 
role of anger implied in Pettigrew and colleagues’ notion of what we dubbed inverted relative 
deprivation. And, consistent with more general emotion research, anger provided a potent 
explanation of participants’ willingness to engage in action. The greater participants’ anger about 
their perceived relative deprivation, the greater their willingness to write letters, organize 
demonstrations, and vote for political candidates to oppose government redress to the out-group 
seen as the reason for the in-group’s deprivation. Thus, individuals’ subjective perception of 
relative deprivation fueled their political opposition through the specific emotion of anger. 
Although previous research has shown the general negativity in symbolic racism to 
provide an empirical explanation of opposition to government redress to the structurally 
disadvantaged, the present results suggested a much more specific explanation. Perceived inter-
group relative deprivation, and its attendant anger, fully explained the willingness to engage in 
political action against government redress. Thus, rather than being a general explanation of such 
willingness, symbolic racism promoted the specific inert-group perception of relative 
deprivation. As such, relative deprivation-based anger provides a more circumscribed 
phenomenological account of why prejudice predicts a willingness for political action against 
government redress. Of course, further evidence from other contexts is an important area of 
future research 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although measures of (symbolic, modern, or other) prejudice may capture the general 
negativity in the affect and the attitudes that the structurally advantaged have toward the 
structurally disadvantaged, they do not capture the more specific psychological meaning that 
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individuals give their experience of structural inequality (Leach, 2006). In contrast, the notion of 
inverted relative deprivation specifies more precisely how such individuals perceive their in-
group’s relation to the structurally disadvantaged. It is this specific perception of their inter-
group relation that can be expected to promote the specific group-based emotion of anger (Leach 
et al., 2002; more generally, see E.R. Smith, 1993). 
Because anger is typically felt as a righteous response to perceived unfairness, it is 
especially likely to promote intentions of oppositional action (for reviews see Averill, 1983; 
Lazarus, 1991). In the case of inverted relative deprivation, this anger promotes a willingness to 
engage in political action against government redress to the structurally disadvantaged. That this 
willingness is based in an inversion of objective reality only serves to make more clear the need 
of a model that conceptualizes the subjective feelings the structurally advantaged have about 
their inter-group relations. The relative deprivation-based anger examined here provides a model 
of oppositional politics among members of structurally advantaged groups. 
More generally, these results demonstrate the conceptual and practical advantages of 
studying specific emotions embedded in particular inter-group relations, rather than the more 
generic concepts of racism, prejudice, or group bias. Although the notion of group-based anger 
was offered in early work on group-level relative deprivation (e.g., Runciman, 1966), more 
recent work offers a broader view of the role emotion can play in inter-group relations (for 
reviews see E.R. Smith, 1993; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). Here, we showed that it is the specific 
emotion of anger that explains why inverted relative deprivation explains a willingness for 
political action against government redress to the structurally disadvantaged. More passive and 
inactive feelings of dysphoria, such as dejection, could not be expected to explain such action 
intentions (see H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004). 
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More practically, the notion of inverted relative deprivation may help to explain the 
continued appeal of political movements that are fiercely anti-government and anti-outgroup. In 
the last 15  years, parties such as “One Nation” in Australia, the British National Party in 
England, the National Front in France, neo-Nazis in Germany and Austria, and “white power” 
movements in the United States, appear to have increased their numbers and influence by 
appealing to white people’s relative deprivation-based anger (see Fraser & Islam, 2000; Wrench 
& Solomos, 1993). All of these parties gained some support among disenfranchised members of 
the white majority by portraying their in-group as relatively deprived to immigrants, asylum 
seekers, or other structurally disadvantaged out-groups. Much of this rhetoric referred to feelings 
of  anger about this perceived relative deprivation (e.g., Hanson, 1996). Thus, relative 
deprivation based-anger appears to be a basis of white political opposition to racial redress in a 
number of different societies over thirty years after Pettigrew and colleagues suggested it as an 
explanation in the United States. 
 That members of a group with such clear structural advantage as non-Aborigines in 
Australia can perceive themselves as relatively deprived may also help to explain the political 
divide that can occur between advantaged and disadvantaged. In a society where both the 
structurally advantaged and the disadvantaged see themselves as relatively deprived there is little 
shared reality between them. Indeed, each party’s belief in the righteousness of their political 
opposition may serve to widen the chasm between them. At best, such opposed views of 
inequality prevent coordinated effort. At worst, they fuel antagonistic political conflict. In either 
case, these opposed views of societal reality may help explain why racial, and other group, 
inequality appears difficult to alter by political consensus.
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Notes 
1. Given that our measure of relative deprivation assesses (1) whether the in- or the out-group is 
perceived as deprived as well as (2) the amount of perceived deprivation, we analyzed all data 
with these two elements kept separate. This more complicated approach appeared to offer no 
advantages as it produced nearly identical results to those reported. It is important to note that the 
interaction term was too highly correlated with its constituent elements (r > .90) to be included in 
these analyses.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Inter-Scale Correlations, Non-Supporters of Government  
 
Redress 
 
 
  
     M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
  1. Opposition to Redressa  6.39 1.03 
 
  2. Symbolic Racisma   5.34 1.10  .35*  
 
  3. Relative Deprivationa  5.19 1.85  .29* .60*  
  
  4. Guiltb    .45 .70 -.17  .05 .02  
 
  5. Angerb    1.20  1.52  .25*  .50* .49* .27* 
  
  6. Willingness for Political Actiona 3.51 1.49 -.02  .23 .25* .16 .50* 
 
 
a1-7 response scale b0-5 response scale. N = 77. 
 
* p < .05
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1a: Full Mediation Model Predicting Willingness for Political Action Against 
Government Redress (standardized solution). 
Figure 1b: Alternative Full Mediation Model Predicting Willingness for Political Action Against 
Government Redress (standardized solution).
